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ABSTRACT
The paper describes the role of technical excellence 
and communication in the development and 
maintenance of safety and mission assurance 
programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization 
is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that 
strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and 
that contribute to healthy and effective organizational 
cultures. The events and conditions leading to the 
development of the MSFC S&MA organization are 
reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. 
The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk 
assessment roles are discussed. The structure and 
functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance functions are presented. The current 
organization’s mission and vision commitments serve 
as the starting points for the description of the current 
organization. The goals and objectives are presented 
that address the criticisms of the predecessor 
organizations. Additional improvements are 
presented that address the development of technical 
excellence and the steps taken to improve 
communication within the Center, with program 
customers, and with other Agency S&MA 
organizations.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are a number of factors that need to be 
considered in the development of a sound and 
effective S&MA organization.  Most importantly 
there is a need to make sure that organizational
capabilities are consistent with organizational 
responsibilities.  Technical excellence and 
communication skills are a necessary foundation for 
any successful effort.
2. BACKGROUND
The development of the major elements of the 
S&MA function at the MSFC has followed different 
paths. At the time of the Challenger accident, the 
differences in the safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance functions were both organizational and 
functional in nature. 
The MSFC Safety Office had both a System Safety 
Office and an Industrial Safety Office; however, the 
Safety Office heritage was based on its role as an 
Industrial Safety organization.  The System Safety 
effort was a relatively new effort in response to an 
Agency level initiative after the Apollo I fire.  
System Safety Engineering was a “foreign” concept 
from the aviation and defense industries; introduced 
after the Saturn V launch vehicle design and 
development was completed.  Flight safety for MSFC 
systems had been achieved by a combination of 
conservative design and extensive testing supported 
by active reliability and quality assurance functions.  
The reliability and quality assurance functions were 
in the Quality and Reliability Laboratory and closely 
tied to the Center Engineering effort by tradition and 
organizational structure.  The major Reliability 
Analyses Tools which include Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), and the Critical Items List 
(CIL) were familiar to the engineering community,
with the CIL having been introduced during the 
Saturn V development.  At this time there were 
reliability and quality assurance groups within the 
Program offices who provided insight and 
coordination between the Lab and the respective 
projects.
For the System Safety effort, it was a question of a 
general lack of “clout”, not organizational position,
since the organization reported directly to the Center 
Director.  In this context, clout is the power to direct, 
shape, or otherwise influence conditions that have to 
do with flight safety and mission success.  There are
four organizational attributes that promote clout: 
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organizational mass (size), organizational skills 
(knowledge and ability to apply), organizational 
responsibilities, and organizational connections 
(formal & informal).  Conversely it follows that for 
any S&MA organization, the lack of, or weakness in
any of those characteristics reduces that 
organization’s clout.  It is important that management 
constantly review their organization’s performance to 
assure the most effective and relevant effort is being 
made.
The lack of organizational mass impacts an 
organization’s ability to assess potential issues or 
concerns.  This leads to a lack of independent 
assessment and the tendency to accept the status quo.  
In a design and development phase, where a number 
of product development teams are active, the lack of 
personnel limits the system safety organizations 
ability to interact directly with the design teams.  
Opportunities are lost to achieve design solutions to 
potential safety risks with the minimum impact on 
system design.   It also deprives the system safety 
team insight and understanding of design and 
operational details that could adversely affect their 
ability to provide effective system safety support for 
the life cycle of the program/project.
Shortcomings in an organization’s defined, or 
assumed, role in a parent organization can also 
contribute to the underperformance of an S&MA 
effort.  S&MA roles and responsibilities need to be 
clearly defined and reflected in the program/project
and the general organizational structure.   Customer 
feedback is another important form of 
communication to assure the effectiveness of an 
S&MA program.   Evaluations of the quality of 
service, products, and personnel should be solicited 
periodically from customers at both the working and 
management levels.  Internal surveys provide an 
opportunity for self-assessment and a vehicle for 
employees to offer suggestions for improving the 
organizations performance.  The information 
collected can then be utilized to update strategic 
planning and the structure of the day-to-day program 
support.  
While some compensations and adjustments can be 
made, major shortcomings in any of those general 
characteristics will increase the likelihood of 
unsatisfactory performance by the assurance 
organization. Clout and performance has a direct 
relationship (not necessarily one-to-one).  
Figure 1 – MSFC S, R, M &QA Organization in 1987
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, the 
Rogers Commission was critical of the fact that,
“Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
representatives were not included in technical issue 
discussions on the evening prior to the fateful flight.”
The Commission also noted inadequate S&MA 
staffing at MSFC; “Reductions in the safety, 
reliability and quality assurance work force at 
Marshall and NASA Headquarters have seriously 
limited capability in those vital functions (safety 
program responsibility) to ensure proper 
communications.” [1]
In direct response to the Rogers Commission findings 
on the Challenger accident, a new Safety and Mission 
organization was established at MSFC as shown in 
Figure 1.  The functions of the Center Safety Office 
(Industrial & Systems Safety) were combined with 
the Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality 
Assurance functions that had been formerly part of 
the center Science and Engineering Directorate. The 
new Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality 
Assurance Office reported directly to the Center 
Director.  A mission support contractor function was 
also established to provide technical support for the 
different disciplines that made up the new 
organization.   Within a short time, the organization 
was re-named the Safety and Mission Assurance 
Office to better reflect the major objectives of the 
office.
Soon after the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)
completed the return-to-flight activities and resumed 
its flight program, the S&MA disciplines came under 
pressure to reduce the size of the new organization at 
MSFC.  Successful flights and a general shift in the 
NASA Shuttle role from an insight (assurance) role 
to an over-sight role were coupled with a lack of
appreciation for the importance of the role of the 
S&MA organization. This led to the perception that 
such reductions would be beneficial, or at least not 
harmful.  The reductions were promoted as reducing 
unneeded “duplicate” functions that would not have a 
negative impact on the Shuttle program.
3.  ISSUES AND CONCERNS
In 1999, the Space Shuttle Independent Assessment 
Team (SIAT) cautioned, “that oversight processes of 
considerable value, including Safety and Mission 
Assurance, and Quality Assurance, have been diluted 
or removed from the program. The SIAT feels 
strongly that NASA Safety and Mission Assurance 
should be restored to the process in its previous role 
of an independent oversight body, and not be simply 
a safety auditor." [2]
The SIAT review findings were consistent with 
alarms raised by other outside assessment teams 
which shared similar concerns about the state of the 
SSP S&MA efforts.  The concerns fell into five 
general conditions with the same basic fault:
• Lack of resources
• Lack of independence
– Funding
– Authority
• Lack of discipline and domain expertise
• Lack of engagement in technical decision 
making
• Lack of respect for technical capability
The basic problem was that S&MA had often not 
been funded at the levels required to carry out its 
assignments. Almost all S&MA efforts were directly 
funded by programs and projects which required
S&MA to compete for funding with engineering and 
program/project requirements.  Even S&MA staffing 
levels were negotiated with and directly funded by 
the Center’s programs and projects. This resulted in 
an S&MA organization that was beholden to
programs and projects for people, tools, and travel.  
The lack of an independent source of funding limited 
S&MAs ability to levy requirements on programs and 
projects beyond the program’s expectations which 
further clouded the S&MA lines of authority.  
Adding to the difficulty in securing proper support,
was the fact that the S&MA organization was often 
seen as overhead by Center programs and projects.  
In addition, there was a general lack of customer 
understanding of the total S&MA equity in the 
program effort.  Customers had a limited view of 
S&MA as strictly a regulatory organization.  
From an engineer talent perspective, a career in 
S&MA was not usually the first choice of NASA’s 
best and brightest engineers and the S&MA grade 
structure was not on a par with engineering 
counterparts. Another factor was that S&MA’s
downsizing in the 1990’s required the civil servant 
engineering workforce to become S&MA generalist 
at the expense of discipline expertise. 
In the area of discipline expertise, since the S&MA 
disciplines of systems safety, reliability and 
maintainability, and quality engineering are not 
normally offered as university degree majors, S&MA
discipline expertise had to be developed and 
cultivated within an organization’s S&MA 
community.  Unfortunately the NASA training and 
development programs after the Challenger accident 
were still inadequate to address S&MA development 
needs.  There were no formal programs for S&MA 
discipline development and qualification.  
Shortcomings in institutional training capabilities 
could not be offset by out-side sources because of 
shortages in formal training and related travel dollars.  
Use of outside training also adversely impacts 
minimally staffed S&MA organizations which have
to choose between getting the job done and providing 
“off-the-job” time for engineers to obtain training. 
Unfortunately the reduction in the capabilities of the 
NASA S&MA organizations continued from just 
after the Challenger accident in 1988 until the 
Columbia accident in 2002.  Generally organizations 
with a history of weak safety cultures have difficulty 
maintaining improved cultures even in the aftermath 
of major accidents unless there is a true shift in the 
culture of the organization.  The Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (CAIB) report on the Space 
Shuttle Columbia accident stated that, “NASA’s 
organizational culture and structure had as much to 
do with this accident as the External Tank foam.”  
The Board had expected to find vigorous safety 
organization with strong processes and an effective 
safety effort based on the changes put in place in 
response the findings of the Rogers Commission.  It 
was disappointed to find that, “Shuttle Program 
safety personnel failed to adequately assess 
anomalies and frequently accepted critical risks 
without qualitative or quantitative support, even 
when the tools to provide more comprehensive 
assessments were available.”  The Board also was 
critical of the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance 
organization’s performance in key program meetings 
during the STS-107 mission; noting the absence of 
any dissenting opinions and the silence of program-
level safety participants that undermined their 
oversight role.  “When they did not speak up, safety 
personnel could not fulfill their stated mission to 
provide checks and balances.”  The Board found a 
pattern of acceptance of the foam loss problems 
without sufficient engineering justification that was 
not challenged by S&MA. [3]
4. CURRENT S&MA FOCUS
The current S&MA organizational focus is on the 
implementation of the S&MA Mission & Vision 
Statements.  The S&MA Mission is to enable 
NASA's success through proactive engagement of 
S&MA expertise. The S&MA Vision is to contribute 
to NASA success through Safety and Mission 
Assurance excellence. Technical excellence and 
communication provide the cornerstones for the 
current efforts to conduct a successful Safety and 
Mission Assurance program.
4.1. Technical Excellence 
Three efforts were instrumental to the development 
of technical excellence:  the development of 
discipline expertise within S&MA; improvement in 
the role in technical issue discussions; and the 
development of the necessary resources to the 
meeting the challenges of the desired organizational 
roles and contributions.
Discipline expertise is developed via a Professional 
Development Program.  All S&MA personnel are 
required to select an S&MA discipline as their
primary area of expertise.  Professional Development 
Roadmaps (PDRMs) were created to identify and list 
the courses, knowledge and the experience   
necessary to be qualified at the various levels of 
S&MA discipline development. Discipline 
Champions were established to train and mentor 
S&MA personnel in their efforts to develop 
individual discipline knowledge and expertise.   
Mandatory discipline working groups were 
established to provide a forum for discipline 
development and knowledge sharing conducted by 
the individual Discipline Champions. [4]
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Figure 2. PDRM Flow Chart
4.2. Communication  
For any S&MA effort to be effective there must be 
meaningful communication with the customer. The 
objective is the exchange of relevant information. 
While the skills and effort needed may vary with the 
type of information involved, the basic principles 
remain the same.  For example, risk information may 
be a combination of data, knowledge, and 
professional opinions. The S&MA team must be able 
to communicate with design and engineering staff 
about details of the product and the associated 
operational environment to build their technical data 
base.  The resulting risk assessments must address
the basic elements of risk source identification, risk 
analysis, determination of controls, and follow-
though of the disposition. The S&MA efforts are of 
no value unless the information is properly 
communicated to program management. [5]
Efforts were made on several fronts to improve 
communications with the S&MA customers as part of 
the current S&MA focus activities. One of the first 
steps taken was to conduct a general survey of the 
S&MA Directorate customers seeking: feedback 
from leadership customers on the overall service and 
quality of the S&MA effort;  to garner feedback from 
civil servant employees and contractor support staff 
regarding the organization’s performance over the 
past year and to solicit their suggestions for 
improvements; and to update its strategic plan based 
upon continuing development of its mission-related 
environment to support major NASA projects.
A number of organizational changes were made.  An 
S&MA Deputy for Program Assurance was 
established.  The position was staffed with a senior
(SES) manager rotated from outside the organization.  
Steps were made to improve organizational 
understanding and communication both within and 
external to the S&MA organization.  Outside hiring 
was utilized to strengthen areas where technical 
expertise was lacking.  
The Safety and Mission Assurance Council (SMAC)
was developed and implemented.  The SMAC 
provided a direct role in the MSFC governance 
process; providing a forum for the review of issues 
critical to S&MA and a setting for technical dialogue 
with the MSFC engineering community via panel 
membership.
Continuous 
Learning
And 
Mentoring
There was also an increased emphasis on early 
involvement in MSFC projects and programs.  For 
the Constellation Program, members of the S&MA 
team were actively involved in the establishment of 
the program S&MA requirements and definition of 
needed program elements.  Several S&MA trade 
studies were conducted to support vehicle 
architecture assessments and major system selections.  
The wide range of safety review experience within 
the S&MA organization was utilized in providing 
inputs to the development of the Constellation Safety 
Review Process.
5. THE S&MA COMMITMENT
The current MSFC S&MA organization is founded 
on and committed to the following key tenants:
 The development and maintenance of an 
organization that is respected for its 
technical expertise where NASA’s best and 
brightest want to work.
 An organization that actively trains and 
develops its people to assure that the 
discipline technical expertise is consistent 
and reliable.  
 An organization that is known for rewarding
and acknowledging superior performance by 
its members.
 An organization which brings unique 
engineering expertise to the table in support 
of programs and projects.  
 An organization that programs see as a must 
have - not a forced to have - and programs 
request S&MA support beginning with 
formulation.  
 An organization that not only identifies 
issues, but also helps identify solutions.
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